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1. Whether the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act, which causes damage to an 
individual’s reputation and requires an alteration in his state citizenship status, violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, which has a punitive intent and 
punitive effects, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied retroactively to 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOVEMBER TERM, 2002
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al
Petitioners,
V.
JOHN DOE, et al.,
Respondents.
RONALD O. OTTE and BRUCE M. BOTHELO, 
Petitioners,
V.
JOHN DOE I, et al..
Respondents
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Respondents, JOHN DOE, appellant in cause 01-1231 before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and JOHN DOE I and JOHN DOE II, appellants in cause 01- 
0729 before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respectfully submit this 
brief,
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Second Circuit in Doev. Dept, of Pub. Safety. 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 
2001), and the Ninth Circuit in Doe I v. One. 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) are reproduced in 
their entirety in the Joint Appendix.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “No State 
shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const, amend. XIV, The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “no State shall . . pass any ... Ex 
Post Facto law . . . ” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. The relevant portions of these provisions are 
reproduced in Appendix A,
The relevant statutory provisions from the Connecticut Code of Criminal Procedure and 
the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure are set forth in Appendix B and Appendix C, 
respectively .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v, Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
Identification of the parties
This appeal addresses consolidated cases from Connecticut and Alaska involving each 
state’s sex offender registration statutes. In the Connecticut case. Doe v. Dept, of Pub. Safety. 
271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001) (“John Doe”), the Second Circuit held that the Connecticut Sex 
Offender Registration Act (“Connecticut SORA”) violated the Due Process Clause because it did 
not provide an allegedly non-dangerous offender with a due process hearing In the Alaska case. 
Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (“John Doe I and John Doe 11”), the Ninth Circuit held 
that the retroactive application of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“Alaska SORA”) 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because of its punitive nature.
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The Connecticut registration statute
On February 22, 1999, John Doe filed a complaint with the United States District Court, 
District of Connecticut, alleging that the Connecticut SORA violated his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to procedural due process. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 24, 61.) John Doe sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit Petitioner, the State of Connecticut, from publicly 
disclosing his private information according to the statutory mandates of the Connecticut SORA 
(J.A. at 20, 21 )
On July 9, 1999, John Doe moved for summary judgment. (J.A. at 64.) On September 
13, 1999, the State of Connecticut filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (J.A. at 67.) On 
March 31, 2001, the district court granted John Doe’s motion for summary judgment. (J.A. at 
69.) On May 17, 2001, the district court issued a permanent injunction in favor of the due 
process claim. (J A. at 71.) On May 18, 2001, the State of Connecticut appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (J.A. at 73.)
On October 19, 2001, the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district court, 
affirming that the Connecticut SORA violated John Doe’s protected liberty interest. Dept, of 
Pub. Safety. 271 F.3d at 62.
The Alaska registration statute
On June 3, 1994, John Doe I and John Doe II filed a complaint with the United States 
District Court, District of Alaska, alleging that the Alaska SORA violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. (J.A. at 112.) On July 10, 1998, the State of Alaska filed a motion for summary 
judgment. (J.A. at 202.) John Doe I and John Doe II subsequently filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on September 2, 1998. (J.A. at 203.) On August 12, 1999, a second United
3
On August 19, 1999, John Doe I and John Doe II appealed the district court’s decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (J.A. at 204.) On April 9, 2001, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that the retroactive application of 
the Alaska SORA constituted a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because of its punitive 
effects Otte. 259 F.3d at 995.
Consolidation of the causes of action
This Court granted certiorari for Doe v. Dept, of Pub. Safety on the due process claim on 
May 20, 2002. (J.A. at 108.) This Court also granted certiorari for Doe v. Otte on the ex post 
facto claim on February 19, 2002. (J.A at 229 ) This Court consolidated the claims of both 
cases. (J.A. at 230.)
Statement of Facts
The Connecticut registration statute
John Doe, a resident of the State of Connecticut, was convicted of an offense requiring 
registration as a “sexual offender” pursuant to the Connecticut SORA. (J.A. at 3.) The 
Connecticut SORA publication requirements made John Doe’s name and personal information 
available to the public and classified him as a “sexual offender” without providing for a due 
process hearing to determine whether he poses any actual threat to society. (J.A. at 16, 17.) 
Registration requirements
In 1998 and 1999, the Connecticut Legislature revised its sex offender registration 
statute. (J.A. at 26.) Federal law conditions a state’s receipt of certain federal law enforcement 
grants on the creation of a sex offender registry program. (J.A. at 26.) The federal law mandates
States District Court, District of Alaska, denied the cross-motion for summary judgment and
granted the State of Alaska’s motion for summary judgment. (J .A. at 204 )
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The Connecticut SORA imposes onerous registration requirements on individuals 
convicted of sex-related crimes. (J.A. at 7.) Within three days of their release into the 
community, all registrants must provide certain “identifying factors,” including their name, 
residence address, criminal history record, fingerprints, photograph, and a description of other 
identifying characteristics, as required by the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) (J.A. at 26.)
Further, individuals must comply with address verification procedures for their entire 
registration period (J.A. at 11.) Registrants must submit an address verification form every 
ninety days after their initial registration dates. (J A. at 11 ) The Connecticut SORA also 
restricts the mobility of convicted persons by requiring that any change in address be reported 
within five days to the Commissioner of Public Safety. (J A, at 11) Failure to follow each of 
the registration provisions subjects registrants to possible arrest and prosecution for a class D 
felony. (J.A at 11.)
The registration requirements in Connecticut are conditioned on conviction for one of 
four offenses enumerated in the statute. (J.A. at 7.) While the duration of the registration 
requirements depends on the nature of the conviction, the registry itself does not distinguish 
between different categories of risk. (J A. at 8.) Under the Connecticut SORA, persons 
convicted of a nonviolent sexual offense must register for at least ten years. (J.A. at 8.) Lifetime 
registration is required for convictions involving: (1) a criminal offense against a minor; (2) a 
nonviolent sexual offense with one or more prior sexual offenses; (3) first-degree sexual assault 
upon a person under thirteen years of age, when the offender is more than two years older than 
the minor; or (4) a sexually violent offense. (J.A. at 9.) Registrants must also submit a blood
that the information in the registry be released to the extent necessary to protect the public from
specific individuals. (J.A. at 26.)
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sample for DNA analysis. (J.A. at 9.) Failure to submit a blood sample subjects a registrant to 
prosecution for a class D felony, punishable by up to five years imprisonment (J.A. at 10, 27.) 
Public dissemination of personal information
The DPS is required to make the registry available to the public at its own offices, at 
every local police department, and at each state police troop. (J.A. at 12 ) The DPS also makes 
the information available to the public through the Internet (J.A. at 12.) The DPS sex offender 
registry website permits any Internet user to search and display the information contained in the 
registry database. (J.A. at 30.) The database can be searched by last name, the first letter of a 
last name, town, or zip code. (J.A. at 30.) Searching by town name or zip code provides the 
names of all registrants living in that area (J.A. at 30 ) Clicking on a listed name brings up a 
web page with a prominent banner branding the individual as a “Registered Sex Offender.” (J.A. 
at 30.) This page contains the registrant’s name, offense, current address, physical description, 
and photograph (J A. at 31.)
The central registry maintained at the DPS and with local law enforcement must be made 
available to the public during regular business hours. (J.A. at 28.) Additionally, the DPS must 
annually remind the state’s media that the registry exists and provide information on how it can 
be accessed. (J.A. at 28.)
The Connecticut SORA also tracks registered individuals by proactively notifying 
residents of any registered person residing in, or planning to reside in, their community. (J.A. at 
16.) This is accomplished through notification of local police or state troopers, who are in turn 
authorized to notify any government agency, private organization, or individual. (J.A at 16.) 
Any state agency, the Judicial Department, any state police troop, or any local police department 
is authorized to provide such notification if it is deemed is necessary to protect the public. (J.A.
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(J.A. at 16.)
The Alaska registration statute
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe 11 are residents of Alaska. (J.A. at 111.) John 
Doe I is a former felon, originally convicted in 1985, who has fully completed his sentence. (J.A. 
at 111,212.) After his release from prison in 1990, John Doe 1 received custody of his daughter 
following a court determination that he had been successfully rehabilitated. (J.A. at 212.) 
Psychiatric evaluations considered in that determination concluded that John Doe 1 has “a very 
low risk of re-offending” and is “not a pedophile ” (J.A. at 212.) John Doe 1 married Jane Doe, 
who was fully aware of his previous conviction, following his release from prison ' (J.A at 
212.)
John Doe II is a former felon whose original conviction occurred on April 8, 1984. (J.A. 
at 213.) Following the completion of his sentence in 1990, John Doe 11 participated in and 
successfully completed a two-year rehabilitative program for the treatment of sex offenders.
(J.A. at 213.)
The Alaska SORA was enacted by the Alaska State Legislature on May 12, 1994. (J.A. 
at 212.) Despite the fact that the enactment of the Alaska SORA occurred nine years after John 
Doe Ts conviction and ten years after John Doe IPs conviction, the State of Alaska seeks to
' In the original complaint, Jane Doc also alleged that her privaev’ right h.id been violated by the broad notification 
requirements of the Alaska SORA. (J.A. at 120.) The Ninth Circuit declined to address this portion of the 
complaint, noting that Jane Doe “will receive all of the relief that she seeks in her complaint" through the 
invalidation of the Alaska SORA on ex post facto grounds Ottc. 259 F 3d at 995 n. 14.
at 16.) This notification thus occurs at the sole discretion of local law enforcement. (J.A. at 16.)
The DPS does not evaluate whether an individual poses any threat to a community before
imposing the registration requirements (J A at 7.) No procedure exists to permit registrants to
contest the necessity of the dissemination of their personal information through the registry.
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enforce its penalties against them. (J.A. at 111.) During their respective initial criminal 
proceedings, John Doe 1 and John Doe II both entered into plea agreements with the district 
attorney. (J A. at 115.) Such plea agreements conserve the State of Alaska’s financial resources. 
(J.A. at 116.) As part of their plea agreements, John Doe 1 and John Doe ll accepted certain 
restrictions on their rights, including the loss of the right to vote, the right to sit on a jury, and the 
right to possess certain firearms. (J.A. at 117.) The State made no representation that any future 
disabilities might be included as part of the plea agreements. (J A. at 117 ) Specifically, the plea 
agreements contained no discussion of the future enforcement of registration and notification 
requirements. (J A at 117.)
Registration requirements
The Alaska SORA requires registrants to register in person, at least once per year, with a 
state trooper office or police department. (J.A. at 141 ) This registration includes the registrant’s 
name, address, place of employment, date of birth, driver’s license, and a list of all convictions 
relevant to the Alaska SORA. (J.A at 141.) Registrants must additionally submit to having 
fingerprints and a photograph taken. (J.A. at 141.)
The duration of the registration requirements depends on the individual’s particular 
criminal history. (J.A. at 141.) If the individual has only one offense, the requirements continue 
for fifteen years. (J.A. at 141.) If the individual has more than one offense, the requirements 
continue for life. (J.A. at 141.) Individuals convicted of “aggravated” offenses must register 
every three months for the remainder of their lives. (J.A. at 213.)
Public dissemination of personal information
The Alaska SORA requires public access to the information provided to law enforcement 
authorities by registrants. (J.A. at 141.) The central registry of information, maintained by the
8
DPS, is available for the nominal purchase fee of $10 or for free at state trooper offices. (J.A. at 
141, 142 ) To further facilitate easy public access to the information, the DPS opened the 
database to the world in June 1997 by making the information available on the Internet at 
httpV/www.dps.state.ak.us/sorcr/. (J.A. at 142.) The information is available free of cost, with 
the express intention to make such “information available to as many citizens as possible ” (J.A. 
at 142 ) The Internet database can be searched by name, partial address, zip code, or city. (J A. 
at 214.) The results of the website’s search function provides the offender’s name, color 
photograph, physical description, street address, employer address, and conviction information. 
(J.A. at 214.) A prominent banner posted above the information provided brands the individual 
as a “Registered Sex Offender.” (J.A. at 214.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Connecticut registration statute
The failure of the Connecticut SORA to provide a due process hearing before depriving 
John Doe of a protected liberty interest violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Due Process Clause provides that no state 
may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Damage to 
reputation, while stigmatizing, is insufficient to establish a liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause. To create a constitutional violation, the stigmatizing conduct must be 
accompanied by some tangible injury or material alteration of legal right or status.
The Connecticut SORA requires that the DPS make available a registry of sex offenders 
to the public through local law enforcement and on the Internet. John Doe’s inclusion in the sex 
offender registry implies that he is currently dangerous. This implication damages his reputation 
and is provably false.
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The Connecticut SORA also imposes onerous registration requirements on individuals 
convicted of sex-related crimes. John Doe’s legal status is altered by the Connecticut SORA 
because the registration requirements of the statute restrict his freedom of movement and subject 
him to felony prosecution.
John Doe has the right under the Constitution to a due process hearing before he is 
deprived of a protected liberty interest. The Connecticut SORA does not satisfy the mandate of 
the Due Process Clause because the statute requires the dissemination of information to the 
public stigmatizing John Doe while imposing on him registration requirements altering his state 
citizenship status.
The Alaska registration statute
The retroactive application of the Alaska SORA violates the Ex Post Fact Clause of the 
United States Constitution because the statue demonstrates a punitive legislative intent.
Although the Alaska Legislature expressed a non-punitive purpose when enacting the statute, the 
structure and design of the Alaska SORA are also critical to determining legislative intent. The 
statutory structure of the Alaska SORA evidences a punitive intent because of the statute’s 
location in Title 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The criminal sentencing statutes also 
specifically reference the Alaska SORA within the assignments of punishments. The design of 
the statute further illustrates a punitive intent because the excessiveness of the notification 
requirements do not address behaviors made specifically inappropriate for John Doe I and John 
Doe II by their offenses.
The retroactive application of the Alaska SORA also has punitive effects. A statute’s 
punitive effect can be established through a balancing of the factors articulated in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Because the Alaska SORA imposes an
10
Lastly, the retroactive application of the Alaska SORA against John Doe I and John Doe 
II jeopardizes individual liberties and deters rehabilitation. John Doe I and John Doe II 
participated in plea bargains, resulting in the relinquishing of their rights to vote, participate on a 
jury, and possess a firearm. The absence of the registration and notification requirements during 
the plea bargains intrudes upon individual rights when those requirements are imposed 
retroactively. John Doe 1 and John Doe II have also both demonstrated successful efforts at 
rehabilitation from their offenses after completing their sentences over 12 years ago. The 
imposition of an additional penalty upon them at this lime fails deter recidivist behavior while 
affirmatively deterring efforts at rehabilitation.
affirmative disability or restraint, promotes retribution and deterrence, applies to criminal
behavior, and is excessive in relation to its purported non-punitive purpose of promoting public
safety, it is appropriately characterized as a punitive statute.
11
ARGUMENT
I THE CONNECTICUT SORA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IMPLIES 
JOHN DOE IS CURRENTLY DANGEROUS AND IMPOSES BURDENS 
RESTRICTING HIS FREEDOM
The Due Process Clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty Goss v. Lopez. 419 
U S. 565, 574 (1975) When a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is jeopardized 
by government action, the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause must be satisfied.
Id. An individual’s liberty interest in his own reputation attains constitutional protection because 
this interest has been initially recognized and protected by state law. Paul v Davis. 424 U S.
693, 710-11 (1976) The guarantees of the Due Process Clause apply whenever a state seeks to 
remove or significantly alter that protected status. Id
To constitute a violation of due process, an individual must show: (1) their reputation has 
been injured as a result of a demonstrably false statement by the State; and (2) there is a tangible 
state-imposed burden or alteration in their legal status. id at 701-02 This requirement is 
known as the “stigma plus” test. Siegert v Gilley. 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991),
A. John Doe’s Reputation Has Been Injured as a Result of the Publication of the Sex
Offender Remstrv
A statement that stigmatizes an individual constitutes the first part of a due process 
violation if the reputation-tarnishing statement is alleged to be false. Codd v. Velger. 429 
U.S. 624, 627 (1977). A “stigma” is “[a] mark or token of infamy, disgrace, or reproach . . .
Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Lang. 1702 (4th ed 2000). To satisfy the stigma 
element of his claim, John Doe must show that his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is 
at stake because of his inclusion on the sex offender registry and that the assertions made in the 
registry are false. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1971); Codd. 429 
U.S. at 627 The Connecticut SORA publication requirements stigmatize John Doe because the
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statement made about him is sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation and is capable of 
being proved false. Paul. 424 U S. at 701-02.
1. John Doe’s reputation is damaged by the Connecticut SORA publication 
requirements because the DPS website implies he is currently dangerous.
The DPS website stigmatizes John Doe because it does not differentiate between
convicted sex offenders who are currently dangerous and former felons who pose no present
danger to society. The website fails to differentiate between categories of risk and brands
individuals convicted of a wide range of sexually-related crimes with the label “Registered Sex
Offender.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251(a) (West 2002). The inclusion of John Doe in a
registry of sex offenders is stigmatizing for the same reasons this Court recognized inclusion in a
flyer of shoplifters, suspension from school, and inclusion in a posting of excessive drinkers as
stigmatizing. Paul. 424 U.S. at 695-701; Goss. 419 U.S. at 574-75; Constantineau. 400 U.S.
at 435-36; cf Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972) (recognizing no stigma
because state did not base non-renewal of contract on charges of dishonesty or immorality).
The DPS website brands John Doe as a sex offender, a designation that brings
humiliation, ostracism and possible loss of future employment opportunities. In Paul, this Court
reasoned that being included in a flyer of active shoplifters disseminated by local police creates a
stigma 424 U.S. at 695-701. The plaintiffs photograph was included by local police in a flyer
of active shoplifters after the plaintiff had been arrested for shoplifting. 424 U.S. at 695
Although this Court rejected the plaintiff s claim by holding that an injury to reputation alone is
not a “liberty” interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, it recognized that the
designation of “active shoplifter” would inhibit the plaintiff from entering business
establishments and seriously impair his future employment opportunities id at 697, 708-09.
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Like the accused “active shoplifter” in Paul. John Doe suffers the infamy associated with being 
labeled in a derogatory manner.
Furthermore, John Doe has an interest in his standing in the community and his 
opportunities for future employment. A student’s suspension by school authorities for periods of 
up to 10 days based on charges of misconduct creates a stigma Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75. If 
sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the student’s standing with fellow 
pupils and teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and 
employment. Id at 575. Like the student in Goss. John Doe’s standing in his community and 
his opportunities for future employment are damaged by his inclusion in the publication of the 
DPS registry.
In Constantineau. a Wisconsin statute permitting local officials, without notice or 
hearing, to post the names of those who engage in “excessive drinking” in liquor stores and to 
prohibit liquor sales to such persons created a stigma against those individuals. 400 U.S. at 435- 
36. This Court reasoned that the posting “pin[ned] an unsavory label” on the appellee and 
therefore damaged her reputation and stigmatized her Id at 437. Where the State attaches a 
“badge of infamy” to a citizen, due process comes into play. Id at 434. Similarly, John Doe 
has had a “badge of infamy” attached to him because he is included in a website of currently 
dangerous sex offenders.
Here, John Doe is branded by the Connecticut SORA website as a “Registered Sex 
Offender.” See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 54-251(a) The dissemination of the information 
contemplated by the Connecticut SORA to the community at large is harmful to John Doe’s 
personal reputation. John Doe’s interest in his good name, honor and integrity are at stake 
because of his inclusion in an undifferentiated registry While other states have chosen to
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implement a multi-tiered registration system based on an assessment of risk, the Connecticut 
SORA fails to ditferentiate between registrants that are currently dangerous and those who pose 
no current threat to society. Compare Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d 456. 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). John 
Doe’s reputation is damaged by the DPS website because it implies he is currently dangerous.
2. The implication that John Doe is a currently dangerous sex offender is 
provably false.
John Doe has satisfied the stigma element of the stigma plus test because the DPS 
website injures his reputation and he is capable of proving he is not currently dangerous. See 
e.g. Codd> 429 U S. at 627. That John Doe is stigmatized by an implication rather than an 
express assertion does not invalidate his claim. See e.g. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co.. 497 U.S. 1, 
17-20 (1990) (rejecting argument that defamation action should be limited because supposedly 
defamatory comments were not explicit but inferred). Society has a pervasive and strong interest 
in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. Id at 21. The DPS website disclaimer 
does not end this Court’s inquiry. The dispositive question in the instant case is whether a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the substance of the sex offender registry implies that 
John Doe is currently dangerous. S^ id at 21-22.
In Milkovich. a former high school wrestling coach brought a defamation action against a 
newspaper and a reporter, alleging that the reporter’s column implied that the coach perjured 
himself in a judicial proceeding Id at 2. This Court held that simply couching the defamatory 
statements in terms of opinion did not dispel the implications of those statements. Id at 19. 
Similarly, this Court should look past the website disclaimer and focus on the substance of the 
sex offender registry, the main purpose of which is to protect citizens from currently dangerous 
sex offenders. This would not be a problem if the true implication of the website was accurate. 
However, John Doe has alleged that as to him, the website is inaccurate. John Doe need only
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raise the issue of falsity regarding the stigmatizing statement in order to establish a right to a 
name-clearing hearing. Codd, 429 U S. at 627.
In order to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, the truth or falsity 
of the implication of the website should be determined at a hearing. As this Court noted in 
Constantineau. “[0]nly when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label 
on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented.” 400 U S. at 437. John Doe asserts 
that he is not dangerous. He has a right to due process before the State may imply otherwise 
because untruthful speech is not protected by the Supreme Court. See Gertz v. Robert Welch 
lna,418U.S. 323,340(1974).
The State’s assertion that the sex offender registry docs not imply registrants are 
currently dangerous is illogical. Sex offender registration acts were prompted by the seriousness 
of the harm that sex offenders’ actions cause to society and the perception that such offenders 
have a greater probability of recidivism than other offenders, S^ Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 
1266 (2nd Cir. 1997). The stated purpose of the registry is to disseminate truthful information 
about the criminal history of the registrants. This would not be problematic if the information 
disseminated by the state were entirely truthful. See Virginia St Bd. oFPharm. v, Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council. Inc.. 425 U S. 748, 772 (1976) (holding that statutory bans on advertising 
prescription drug prices violated Fourteenth Amendment because advertisements were truthful). 
However, Virginia St. Bd. is distinguishable because it contained no claim that the 
advertisements should be forbidden because they were “false or misleading in any way.” Id In 
this case, despite the DPS’s assertion that they have “made no determination that any individual 
included in the Registry is currently dangerous,” this Court should see through the form of the 
disclaimer. (J.A. at 31.) The information on the website, according to language posted on the
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The implication that John Doe is currently dangerous is sufficiently factual to be capable 
of being proved true or false. See Milkovich, 497 U S. at 21. Scientific and psychological 
difficulties aside, there are ways of determining if an individual is currently dangerous. By 
simply grouping all registrants together, Connecticut has abdicated its duty to provide its citizens 
with the most fair and accurate registry possible. John Doe has thus satisfied the “stigma” 
requirement of the stigma plus test by alleging in his complaint that he is not currently 
dangerous. If the plus factors are also present, John Doe is entitled to a due process hearing.
B, John Doe’s Legal Status Is Altered Because the Connecticut SORA Restricts His
Freedom of Movement and Subjects Him to Potential Felony Prosecution.
The registration requirements of the Connecticut SORA constitute a plus factor because 
they impose on John Doe an onerous set of legal requirements. Additionally, the Connecticut 
SORA modifies the basic legal status of John Doe because, although he has served his sentence, 
he must maintain his registration for the rest of his life under threat of criminal prosecution.
This Court has never before considered whether onerous registration and notification 
requirements under a sex offender registry act constitute a plus factor in the stigma plus test. 
There is also no consensus within the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding how to apply the 
plus factors created by Paul. As the Second Circuit stated, “[I]t is not entirely clear what the 
‘plus’ is . . . . Although Paul is the foundation for all subsequent cases dealing with 
governmental defamation, its meaning is not unambiguous.” Neu v. Corcoran. 869 F.2d 662,
site itself, is “made available for the purpose of protecting the public ” (J.A. at 84.) If the
individuals on the website are not dangerous, there is no need for the public to be protected from
them. The true implication of the website is that each person listed is more likely than the
average person to be currently dangerous.
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667 (2d Cir 1989): see also Ersek v. Township of Springfield. 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir 1996) 
(referring to “plus” factor as “uncertain”).
According to this Court, the plus factor of the stigma plus test is met when an individual 
can demonstrate “an alteration or impairment of a right or status previously recognized by state 
law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. The procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply 
whenever a State seeks to remove or significantly alter previously protected status. See e g. 
Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 437 (governmental action deprived individual of right, previously 
held under state law, to purchase or obtain liquor in common with rest of citizenry); Goss. 419 
U.S. at 575 (stigma plus extinguishing of state-law right to public education). Furthermore, there 
is no requirement that the status protected by the State be codified in a statute. See e g, 
Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 435-37; Paul. 424 U.S. at 708.
Additionally, the rights asserted by an individual must be distinguishable from a 
traditional defamation claim brought under state law in that they cannot be imposed by a state 
actor in a position analogous to the state defendants. ^ Screws v. United States. 325 U.S. 91, 
108-109 (1945) (noting Congress, in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, created protection 
only for acts under color of law depriving an individual of some right secured by Constitution or 
laws of United States). The harm or injury to an interest must create a “change of . . . status as 
theretofore recognized under the State’s laws.” P^, 424 U.S at 712 Therefore, to satisfy the 
plus factor of the stigma plus test, John Doe must show the statutory registration requirements 
imposed on him by the State alter his legal status.
This Court in Constantineau reasoned that governmental action depriving individuals 
deemed “excessive drinkers” of the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common with the rest of 
the citizenry constituted a plus factor. See 400 U.S. at 435-37. Prior to the enactment of this
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legislation, John Doe’s freedom was not restricted and he did not have to comport with the 
onerous registration requirements under the threat of criminal prosecution. John Doe has 
satisfied the plus element of the stigma plus test because, similar to the individual in 
Constantineau who enjoyed the right to purchase alcohol in common with the rest of the 
citizenry, John Doe’s right to be treated in common with the rest of the citizenry has been 
substantially altered by the registration requirements of the Connecticut SORA
Four other district courts have used similar reasoning to identify a protected liberty 
interest under the stigma plus test. The District of Columbia Circuit held that a sex offender 
registry statute similar to Connecticut’s infringed upon a protected liberty interest because its 
registration requirements and lengthy period of supervised release imposed an “extraordinary 
breadth and extent of burden” which, when combined with harm to reputation, satisfied the 
stigma plus test. Doe v. Williams. 167 F. Supp, 2d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The District Court 
in the Middle District of Alabama held that the imposition of new legal duties and the 
extinguishing of other rights, including the right to establish a new residence without giving prior 
notice to governmental officials, constituted a plus factor. Doe v. Prvor. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 
1231 (M .D. Ala. 1999). The District Court in the Southern District of New York held that in 
light of the requirements placed on registrants, “there can be no genuine dispute” that registration 
alters the legal status of all convicted sex offenders. Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468. Because the 
requirements encroach on personal liberties, registered sex offenders suffer a tangible 
impairment of a right in addition to harm to reputation. Iff The District Court in the District of 
New Jersey held that stigma plus can be established by coupling the damage to reputation with 
the continuing legal status as a registrant and the duties imposed as a result. W.P. v. Poritz. 931
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F Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. E B. v. Verniero. 119 F.3d 
I077(3dCir. 1997).
Federal cases holding that registration requirements do not violate due process are 
distinguishable from the instant case because those decisions are based on allegations that a 
privacy interest was implicated. See Russell v. GreKoire. 124 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding three-tiered system of registration for "Level Three” registrants, and rejecting notion 
that registrants had right to privacy), Femedeer v. Haun, 35 F. Supp 2d 852, 860-61 (D. Utah 
1999) (holding plaintiff did not have constitutional right to privacy for information already fully 
available to public); Lanni v, Engler. 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D Mich. 1998) (holding 
notification did not violate any privacy interest); Doe v. Kelly, 961 F. Supp 1105, 1107 (W.D. 
Mich. 1997) (denying claims for injunctive relief due to lack of privacy right); but see Cutshall v 
Sundquist. 193 F 3d 466, 479-82 (6th Cir 1999) (holding Tennessee law did not expressly 
infringe upon ability to seek, obtain, and maintain job).
In contrast, many state courts have struck down sex offender registration acts by relying 
on a state-created right to privacy. See Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136, 143-45 (1997) 
(holding sex offender act unconstitutional because it offered no procedure to challenge 
registration requirement, therefore failing to provide appropriate procedural due process); Doe v. 
Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 52-53 (1995) (holding notification implicated protectible liberty interests in 
reputation and privacy for due process purposes).
Here, John Doe has met the plus factor of the stigma plus test because the registration 
obligations under Connecticut SORA impose significant burdens on him and are governmental in 
nature. The Connecticut SORA imposes a restriction on John Doe’s ability to move freely 
within the State of Connecticut and throughout the country Prior to the enactment of this
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legislation his freedom was not restricted. See e g Saenz v. Roe. 526 U S. 489, 504 (1990) 
(recognizing the right to travel)
The registration duties imposed by the State are extensive and onerous. Individuals 
convicted of a criminal act against a minor, a nonviolent sexual offense, or a felony with a sexual 
purpose must verify their address annually for ten years. Conn Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-257(c). 
Individuals convicted of a sexually violent offense must register every ninety days for the rest of 
their lives. Id If a registrant fails to return the address verification form, the DPS is required to 
notify the local police, who may then arrest the registrant. Conn. Gen. Stat Ann § 54-251(d). 
This means that John Doe, a former felon who has completed his sentence, must verify his 
address at least once a year, within ten days of receiving the verification form. Failure to verify 
his address in this manner subjects John Doe to felony prosecution. While in Paul, the 
dissemination of flyers by local police did not constitute a plus factor, here John Doe is 
affirmatively required by the state to submit to address verification. This constitutes a “state 
imposed burden” and satisfies the plus test from Paul See 424 U S. at 701.
A registrant must notify the Commissioner of Public Safety of a change of address within 
five days Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann. § 54-25l(a). If he “regularly travels into or within another 
state or temporarily resides in another states for purposes including, but not limited to 
employment or schooling,” he must notify the Connecticut Commissioner and register with the 
appropriate agency in the other state. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann, § 54-253(b) The registrant must 
also provide blood samples for DNA analysis when first registering and appear at a specified 
location to have his or her photograph taken whenever the Commissioner requests, but at least 
once every five years. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a). Failure to 
abide by any of these obligations constitutes a class D felony, punishable by up to five years in
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prison. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 54-251(d), 54-252(d), 54-254(b). This Court should follow the 
reasoning of the district court in Prvor and hold that the imposition of new legal duties and the 
extinguishment of other rights, including the right to establish a new residence without giving 
prior notice to governmental officials, constitute a plus factor, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
John Doe has satisfied the stigma plus test from Paul because he has an interest in his 
reputation, and his inclusion in the undifferentiated sex offender registry imposes upon him 
significant burdens altering his status under state law. 424 U.S. at 711. The statute is 
unconstitutional because it does not provide John Doe a due process hearing before his 
reputation is harmed and his legal status is altered. Id^ Registration as a “sex offender” under 
the Connecticut SORA is continuing, intrusive, and humiliating. The harm to John Doe’s 
reputation coupled with the onerous registration burdens required by the Connecticut SORA 
constitutes a protectible interest under the United States Constitution.
Although the State of Connecticut has an interest in protecting its citizens, the State also 
has an interest in ensuring that its notification and registration system is both fair and accurate.
See Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 470. Other states have avoided the defects of the Connecticut SORA 
by implementing a tiered risk classification system for its convicted sex offenders. See e g. id. at 
470-71. As written, the Connecticut SORA fails to protect Connecticut’s citizens, treat its 
citizens fairly, and provide its citizens with accurate information While federal law mandates 
that information in sex offender registries be released to the extent necessary to protect the 
public, the Connecticut SORA mandates that the entire world be given access to the registry 
through the Internet. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (West 2002).
The lack of any classification system within the statute and the overbroad notification 
required by the statute ensure that the Connecticut SORA is neither fair nor accurate. Citizens
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that are better informed as to the dangers presented by sex offenders will be better able to take
precautionary measures to protect themselves and their children. This Court should recognize
both John Doe’s interest and the interest of the citizens of Connecticut in a sex offender
registration statute better designed to achieve the public protection goals of the federal statute.
The Connecticut SORA should be invalidated because it fails to provide its citizens with
accurate information and it deprives John Doe of a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
II. APPLYING THE ALASKA SORA RETROACTIVELY VIOLATES THE EX POST 
FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE OF THE PUNITIVE INTENT AND EFFECTS OF ITS 
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution denies states the power to enact laws which
punish people for acts committed before the law’s passage. See Calder v. Bull. 3 U S, 386, 391
(1798) (holding Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits enactment of any state law which “changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed”); Weaver v, Graham. 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (holding Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits
“any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed’”). Although statutes may
apply retroactively to crimes committed before their enactment, such a statute violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause if it “increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dept.
of Corrections v. Morales. 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3 (1995).
The application of the Alaska SORA is retrospective because it “changes the legal
consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Weaver. 450 U.S. at 31; see also
Miller v. Florida. 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (holding retroactive application of revised sentencing
guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause). The Alaska SORA also “alters the situation of the
offender to his disadvantage” by making the burden on defendant “more onerous” in terms of the
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punitive consequences ofhis past offense. New Jersey v. T P.M.. 189 N.J, Super. 360,366-67 
(1983); see also Weaver. 450 U.S. at 29-30.
Determining whether a statute imposes a punishment requires application of the “intenu 
effects test”: an evaluation of the legislative intent of a statute and the effects of its enforcemer^t 
*^^ssell, 124 F.3d at 1086. Because the structure and design of the Alaska SORA indicate a 
punitive legislative intent and the onerous registration and notification requirements constitute 
additional punishment, the retroactive application of the Alaska SORA violates the Ex Post Fa(;to 
Clause.
A Despite the Purported Non-Punitive Purpose of the Alaska SORA, the Stnirtnr^ 
of the Statute Reveals a Punitive Legislative Intent
If a legislature has a punitive intent in enacting a particular statute, “either expressly or 
impliedly,” the retroactive application of the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause United 
States V. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); see also Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez 372 U.S 
144, 169 (1963). The legislative intent of a statute is determined by considering the statute’s 
declared purpose, structure, and design. See United States v. Urserv. 518 U S. 267 (1996) 
(examining terms used by Congress and structure of forfeiture statute to determine intent).
The declared purpose of the Alaska SORA is the protection of the public from recidivist 
sex offenders. See 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41, § 1. A legislature, however, may not “insulate 
itself from an ex post facto challenge simply by asserting that a statute’s purpose is to regulate 
rather than punish prior conduct.” United States v. Muss. 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993); 
see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (noting statutory “scheme” may rebut legislature’s declared 
nonpunitive intent). The existence of a purported non-punitive purpose “does not alone satisfy 
the inquiry of whether the statute violates the ex post facto clause[] . .” North Dakota v. Burr. 
598 N W. 2d 147, 159 (N.D. 1999) (Kapsner, J., dissenting). The structure and design of the
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statute equally illustrate the legislative intent behind a statute. See Ward. 448 U.S. at 248-49; 
Commonwealth v, Williams. 557 Pa. 285,310 (1999) (“[D]espite the fact that the legislature 
intended that the Act serve as ‘a means of assuring public protection,’ by increasing the 
punishment for the listed predicate offenses . . . the goals of the sexually violent predator 
provisions are equally punitive.”).
1. The statutory structure of the Alaska SORA indicates a punitive legislative 
intent.
The statutory structure of the Alaska SORA illustrates a punitive legislative intent
because of the codification of the registration provision in Alaska’s criminal code, rather than in
the civil code. Alaska Stat § 12.63.010 (LEXIS L. Pubig. 2002). The Alaska SORA is
located in Title 12 of Alaska’s statutory code, entitled “Code of Criminal Procedure.” See id.
To place the registration act in context, section 12.63 of Alaska’s statutory code is within the
same chapter as section 12.55, entitled “Sentencing and Probation.” Furthermore, portions of
Alaska’s statutes pertaining to criminal sentencing make specific reference the Alaska SORA in
2
their sentencing guidelines. See e.g. Alaska Stat. § 12.55.148.
In Russell, the Ninth Circuit held that, despite its location within the penal code, 
Washington’s sex offender registration statute was nevertheless non-punitive. 124 F.3d at 1090- 
91. The Washington statute, however, did not impose a regulatory burden as onerous as that 
imposed by the Alaska SORA. In particular, the Washington statute did not contain notification 
provisions as excessive as the Alaska SORA’s community, employer, and Internet publication 
provisions. Compare id at 1082. The extent and breadth of the burdens imposed by the Alaska
^ Section 12.55.148 of the Alaska penal sentencing code is entitled “Judgment for sex offenses or child kidnappings'" 
and states, in relevant part: “When a defendant is convicted of a sex offense or child kidnapping by a court of tliis 
state, the written judgment must set out the requirements of AS 12.63.010 and, if it can be determined by the court, 
whether that conviction will require the offender or kidnapper to register for life or a lesser period under AS 12.63.”
25
SORA make its placement and references in the state penal code indicative of the punitive natur^ 
of its sanctions
2. The statutory design of the Alaska SORA indicates a punitive legislative 
intent.
A regulatory statute has a punitive design when its regulations extend beyond those 
activities made inappropriate by the offense committed. Huss. 7 F.3d at 1448, If the prior 
conviction “is not the kind of conduct which indicates unfitness to participate in the activity 
[being regulated], it will be assumed the purpose of the statute is to impose an additional 
penally.” Cases v. United States. 131 F.2d916, 921 (IstCir. 1942T cf Huss. 7 F 3d at 1448 
(holding statute prohibiting firearm possession regulatory in nature only because defendant’s 
armed robbery conviction rendered him unfit to possess a firearm).
The onerous registration and notification requirements of the Alaska SORA regulate 
behaviors not made unfit or inappropriate for John Doe 1 and John Doe 11 by their convictions. 
The requirements place a large burden upon the freedom of mobility, privacy interests, and 
employment and housing opportunities of John Doe 1 and John Doe If Although serious. 
Respondent’s offenses do not necessarily render them unfit to reside in any particular community 
or geographic location upon completion of their sentences. Nor do the offenses render them 
unfit to freely change addresses or seek employment opportunities to reintegrate back into 
society. The fact that John Doe I and John Doe II have not committed any further criminal 
offenses since their release in 1990 is clear evidence of their ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
into their respective communities. Furthermore, the Alaska SORA’s excessive registration and 
notification requirements, which differentiate it from other registration statutes, also bear no 
relevant justification. Because no connection exists between the Act’s regulatory requirements
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and the offenses involved here, the statue’s design indicates a punitive purpose. Huss. 7 
F.3d at 1448.
The statutory structure and design of the Alaska SORA outweigh the regulatory intent 
expressed by the Alaska Legislature. Because of the punitive intent of the statute, its retroactive 
application upon John Doe I and John Doe II violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and renders the 
Alaska SORA unconstitutional.
B. The Registration and Notification Requirements of the Alaska SORA Have
Substantial Punitive Effects.
Even if this Court determines the legislative intent behind the Alaska SORA to be non-
punitive, the application of the statute to John Doe I and John Doe II nevertheless violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause Applying the second portion of the Ward intent-effects test, a statute
constitutes punishment when it is “punitive . . . in . . . [its] effect.” 448 U S. at 249. In
Mendoza-Martinez. this Court instructed the consideration of the following seven factors for
determining the punitive effect of a statute:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether 
it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it 
may rationally be connected is assignable to it; and (7) whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
372 U.S. at 168-69.
No specific number of Mendoza-Martinez factors is required to create establish a punitive 
effect, nor is any one particular factor determinative. Hudson v. United States. 522 U.S. 93, 101 
(1997) Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors here, the Alaska SORA has not historically 
been regarded as punishment, it does not come into play only on a finding of scienter, and it 
possesses a rationally-connected non-punitive purpose. Yet an evaluation of the remaining
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factors illustrates the punitive effect of the statute. The Alaska SORA’s punitive effect stems 
from its imposition of an affirmative disability or restraint, its promotion of retribution and 
deterrence, its applicability to criminal behavior, and its excessiveness.
1. The registration and notification requirements of the Alaska SORA 
impose an affirmative disability and restraint upon John Doe.
The first Mendoza-Martinez factor addresses whether the registration provisions involve 
an affirmative disability or restraint. 372 U S. at 168. Here, requirements of the Alaska SORA 
pose a significant affirmative disability and restraint upon Respondents John Doe I and John 
Doe II must report to update their registration information, in person, every 90 days for the next 
15 years
The State of Alaska contends the restrictions involved here were already found non- 
punitive in Russell, where the Ninth Circuit found no affirmative disability or restraint imposed 
by a sex offender registration statute. See 124 F.3d at 1088. This comparison, however, 
disregards the critical distinction between the limitations of Washington’s sex offender 
registration statute and the excessiveness of the Alaska SORA. The Alaska SORA’s 
requirements far outpace those approved in Russell, and it is that very excessiveness that makes 
the affirmative disability and restraint so onerous in this case.
Furthermore, the Alaska SORA’s notification requirements create an enhanced level of 
affirmative disability and restraint because of the wide-spread nature of the dissemination No 
previously court-approved registration statute has harbored the vast provisions for information 
dissemination involved in the Alaska SORA. Cf id at 1082. Where other statutes have rested 
with a localized release of information to specific communities limited to non-comprehensive 
information about the registered individuals, the Alaska SORA provides a wealth of information 
to an unprecedented number of individuals. Cf id The Alaska SORA disseminates all of the
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personal information provided by the registered former offender, including name, address, 
employer, and specific offense. The Alaska SORA also informs employers or potential 
employers of the background history of the individual. The Alaska SORA goes even further in 
making this information available to the entire world at large through the publication of the 
information through the Internet The lack of targeted and specific collection and release of the 
information for the registered offenders makes the Alaska SORA a significantly distinguishable 
creator of an affirmative disability or restraint upon John Doe 1 and John Doe II.
2. Enforcement of the registration and notification requirements of the
Alaska SORA promotes retribution and deterrence.
A second Mendoza-Martinez factor examines whether or not the registration 
requirements promote the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence, 372 U S. 
at 169, Even in Russell, the Ninth Circuit found that the significantly less onerous registration 
requirements of Washington’s registration statute “may implicate deterrence.” 124 F.3d at 1091. 
Given the heightened nature of the registration requirements here, coupled with the vast publicity 
surrounding its enactment and the enactment of related laws around the country, a deterrence 
effect is implicated even more firmly with the Alaska SORA.
The Alaska SORA’s registration requirements also demonstrate a retributive effect 
because of the excessive nature of their application in three ways. First, the requirements 
represent a compelled adherence to behavioral supervision that mirrors the supervision of a 
probationary release from prison. United States v. Soto-Olivas. 44 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting conditions of supervised release involve behavioral supervision similar to probation). 
These types of obligations constitute a core component of punishment typically embodied in a 
criminal sentence. See id. Second, the extensive duration of the registration requirements 
support the conclusion that the Alaska SORA intends a retributive effect. Third, the lack of a
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relationship between the length of the registration requirement to any actual risk assessment 
demonstrates the failure of the Alaska Legislature to mask the punitive purpose of the Alaska 
SORA. While the Alaska Legislature purports the main consideration of the legislation to be the 
protection of the public from risk-positive individuals, the absence of a relationship between the 
duration of the requirements and the actual risk posed by those former offenders strongly 
suggests a purely punitive purpose.
3. The registration and notification requirements of the Alaska SORA apply 
only to criminal behavior.
^ Mendoza-Martinez factor questions whether the behavior to which the 
requirements apply is already a crime. 372 U S. at 169. When a statute applies only to behavior 
that is already criminal, the statute demonstrates a punitive effect. Mondoza-Martinez. 372 U S. 
at 168. Unlike registration statutes from other jurisdictions which have been upheld by other 
courts, the Alaska SORA applies only to individuals found “guilty” following a court 
proceeding. See Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100. It does not apply, for example, to individuals found 
not guilty by reason of insanity.” Id This distinct characteristic creates additional indications 
of a punitive effect from the retroactive application of the Alaska SORA upon John Doe I and 
John Doe II.
4. The registration and notification requirements of the Alaska SORA 
impose an excessive and unnecessary burden for the purported purpose of 
protecting the public.
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor weighs whether the registration requirements are 
excessive in relationship to the purported alternative non-punitive purpose. 372 U S. at 169.
^ In contrast to the Alaska SORA, Washington’s sex offender registration statute applies to sex offenders found not 
guilty of the crime. See Russell. I24F.3dat 1091. In fact, this broad application of the statute was "centrar to the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the statute was not punitive. See Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. Utah’s sex offender 
registration statute applied to individuals found not guilty because of “mental incapacity.” See Femedeer v Haun, 
227 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2000).
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A Kansas State Supreme Court decision proves illustrative of the excessiveness involved 
here. In Kansas v. Mevers. the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that a sex offender registration 
statute allowing unrestricted, unfettered access to the registration information had a punitive 
effect. 260 Kan. 669, 699-700 (1996). The court considered the fact that the statute’s 
implementation and enforcement did not consider any actual assessment of risk on the part of the 
registered offender before disseminating the information on such a wide-spread scale. Id at 699.
In fact, that level of information dissemination was specifically found to be “excessive and . . . 
beyond that necessary to promote public safety.” Id
The Alaska SORA suffers from an identical defect. The statute makes available world­
wide the complete registration information of the convicted offenders, regardless of the 
relevance of that information to the promotion of public safety and to the geographical region to 
which the information is ultimately disseminated. In fact, an express purpose and legislative 
intent behind the Alaska SORA was to make the information within the database available to as 
many people as possible. (J.A. at 142.) Noticeably absent from that legislative intent is any 
desire to tailor the release of the information specifically to the relevant parties interested in and 
assisted by the dissemination of such information for the promotion of their own safety.
Courts rejecting ex post fact challenges to community notification provisions have done 
so specifically because the particular statute has tailored the extent of public notification or 
dissemination to the offender’s risk of re-offense and danger to the public.'* In Doe v. Pataki. the
The registration requirements of ASORA are, in fact, excessive because there exist no means by
which an individual may be relieved of the registration requirements. Furthermore, this lack of
an avenue for appeal is not necessary in order to promote public safety.
Many states employ risk assessment detenninations to tailor the statute's remedial goals. Under such a system, Uie
level of notification permitted or required relates to the le^ el of risk the individual offender poses to the public. Risk
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Second Circuit rejected a challenger’s argument that the excessive sweep of New York’s sexual 
offender notification provisions evidenced the registration statute’s punitive effect 120 F.3d at
1281- 82. The registration law called for a risk assessment based on objective criteria. Id at 
1282. Low risk and first time offenders were also allowed to petition the court to be relieved of 
the registration requirements. Id Further, the extent of notification was extremely limited. Id 
The court concluded the law did not constitute punishment because it contained “a number of 
moderating provisions capable of greatly limiting the extent of notification or even of relieving 
the offender from notification altogether.” Id Because the court concluded the notification 
provisions contained procedures which carefully tailored the amount of information accessible 
and the recipients to whom registry information could be disseminated based upon the offender’s 
specific risk of recidivism, it held “the legislature acted well within its authority in determining 
the kind of offenses triggering notification, the category of persons subject to the Act’s 
requirements, and the extent of notification appropriate to promote its non-punitive goals.” Id at
1282- 83.
The Alaska SORA is noticeably and significantly deficient in means for specifically 
tailoring its notification requirements to the risk imposed by a particular individual. No 
mechanism for the review of an individual’s likelihood of recidivism exist. In fact, contrary to 
considering individualized risk assessments, the application of the Alaska SORA upon John 
Doe I disregards an independent court determination finding he is “not a pedophile” and has “a 
very low risk of re-offending.” (J.A. at 212.) The excessiveness of the statute is also 
demonstrated by the breadth of the dissemination of the database information through the
determinations are commonly made by an independent hearing board or the court, and are based on a series of 
objective factors. Typically, registration information concerning low or no risk offenders is subject to the nanowest 
range of disclosure, if at all. See generally Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1083-85 (discussing New Jersey^s public 
notification and risk assessment procedures).
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Internet site, making the database accessible to individuals around the world whose geographical 
distance and separation from Alaska eliminates any necessity for such information. The registry 
database information achieves no promotion of safety for individuals outside of the local 
communities listed in the registry, making the breadth of the dissemination unnecessary and 
unjustified. Because the Alaska SORA lacks the same substantive limitations as the registration 
statute contemplated by the Second Circuit in Pataki. its excessiveness results in a substantial 
punitive effect. Compare 120 F.3d at 1281-82.
C. The Retroactive Application of the Alaska SORA Against John Doe I and John 
Doe II Jeopardizes the Sanctity of Individual Liberties and Creates a Disincentive
to Rehabilitate.
The retroactive application of punitive sanctions in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
offends a principle considered so fundamental to the Framers that it was singled out explicitly as 
a direct restraint on the legislative autonomy of the States. As James Madison observed:
'[E]x post facto laws . . are contrary to the first principles of the social compact.
and to every principle of sound legislation . . . and all of them are prohibited by 
the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught 
us . . that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very 
properly therefore have the Convention added this fEx Post Facto Clause, a]
constitutional bulwarkf.j in favor of personal security and private rights.’
See Myers, 260 Kan at 677 (quoting The Federalist No. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed. 1961)) (emphasis added). The New Jersey Supreme Court appropriately described the 
Ex Post Facto Clause as a “towering constitutional provision of great importance to individual 
dignity, freedom, and liberty.” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. at 42. The improper retroactive 
application of a punitive statute, therefore, places individual rights and liberties squarely in 
harm’s way, subject to a legislative tyranny of the majority and the “unfettered power of the 
state.” Burr. 598 N.W. 2d at 159 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
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The retroactive application of the Alaska SORA upon John Doe 1 and John Doe II 
specifically illustrates this threat to individual rights and liberties. A defendant must be advised 
of the direct consequences of his plea. Bunnell v. Superior Court. 13 Cal. 3d 592, 605 
(1975) (“In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct 
consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute 
[and] registration requirements, if any . . . .”). John Doe I and John Doe II both served sentences 
resulting from plea negotiations arranged between themselves and the District Attorney. As a 
result of their plea agreements, John Doe I and John Doe II accepted the loss of the right to vote 
the right to sit on a jury, and the right to possess certain firearms.
Enforcing the registration and notification penalties of the Alaska SORA to their 
situations renders an essential bargaining element of consideration in their previous negotiations 
invalid. The magnitude of the right to vote, the right to sit on a jury, and the right to bear arms 
cannot be overstated. Yet neither John Doe 1 nor John Doe II had any notice that their 
information would be collected, their personal details distributed to communities, employers, and 
the world at large, and their legal status altered by a future statute’s registration and notification 
requirements when making their respective plea bargains. They each accepted their sentences 
absent any knowledge or consideration of the Alaska SORA. As a result of this failure to advise 
John Doe 1 and John Doe II of registration requirements during their plea bargains—because 
such requirements did not yet exist—the requirements of the Alaska SORA cannot properly be 
applied against them. See People v. McClellan. 6 Cal. 4th 367, 376 (1993) (holding clear error 
where trial court fails to advise defendant of registration requirements arising as consequence of 
guilty plea).
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Furthermore, the retroactive application of the Alaska SORA against John Doe I and Johr 
Doe II eviscerates the incentive to continue the process of rehabilitation Registration statutes 
such as the Alaska SORA were enacted in light of the opinion of several Congressmen that sex 
offenders were “the most difficult [class] of criminals . . . to rehabilitate.” 139 Cong. Rec. HIO- 
321 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep, Ramstad). Contrary to this opinion, studies 
indicate that as many as ninety percent of sex offenders who undergo intensive treatment avoid 
committing future offenses See e.g. Adrian Stone & Margaret Nelson, Sex Offender Watch— 
Neighbors Want Molester Out of Facility. USA. Today, Dec. 17, 1992, at A3. The threat of 
registration, however, deters offenders from seeking treatment. Michele L Earl-Hubbard, The 
Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment. Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended 
Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 788, 855 
(1996) Registration statutes containing notification provisions give offenders a powerful 
incentive to go underground. A Rush to Respond: More Debate Is Needed on “Megan’s Law”, 
Phil, Inquirer, Sept. 2, 1994, at A26. In addition, the effects of community notification often 
prevent a released offender from resuming a normal life, thwarting rehabilitation efforts. Earl- 
Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws at 855.
John Doe I has affirmatively demonstrated an ability and desire to rehabilitate.
Following the completion of his prison sentence in 1990, a court determined that John Doe I had 
been successfully rehabilitated. (J.A. at 212.) Psychiatric evaluations considered in that 
determination concluded that John Doe I is neither a pedophile or a likely recidivist (J.A. at 
212.) As a result of the determination, John Doe I also received custody of his daughter. (J A. at 
212.) John Doe Ts rehabilitation and reintegration to society is further illustrated by his 
marriage to Jane Doe, who was fully aware of his conviction, following his release. (J.A. at
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212.) John Doe 11 has similarly made good faith efforts toward rehabilitation. Following the 
completion of his sentence in 1990, John Doe 11 participated in and completed a two-year 
rehabilitative program for the treatment of sex offenders. (J.A. at 213).
Neither John Doe 1 nor John Doe II have been convicted of any offense since the 
completion of their prison terms in 1990. Neither individual represents a threat to his community 
As such, the retroactive imposition of the penalties of the Alaska SORA, over 12 years after John 
Doe 1 and John Doe II completed their sentences and began successful eftbrts toward 
rehabilitation, fails to enhance public safety and risks deterring their continuing successful 
reform and reintegration into society.
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Respondents respectfully request this Court AFFIRM 
the decision of the Second Circuit in Doe v. Dept of Public Safety, holding that the Connecticut 
SORA violates John Doe’s right to due process, and AFFIRM the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
in Doe v. Otte. holding that the retroactive application of the Alaska SORA’s penalties violates 






United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1
Sec 10, Cl I Powers denied states—Treaties—Money—Ex post facto laws—Obligation of
contracts.
No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and 
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in 
payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts, or grant any title of nobility.
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United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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APPENDIX B
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251 (West 2002)
TITLE 54. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 969 REGISTRATION OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
§ 54-251. Registration of person who has committed a criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor or a nonviolent sexual offense.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense, and is 
released into the community on or after October 1, 1998, shall, within three days following 
such release, and whether or not such person's place of residence is in this state, register such 
person’s name, identifying factors, criminal history record and residence address with the 
Commissioner of Public Safety, on such forms and in such locations as the commissioner 
shall direct, and shall maintain such registration for ten years except that any person who has 
one or more prior convictions of any such offense or who is convicted of a violation of 
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53a-70 shall maintain such registration for life. 
Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a person with respect to a criminal 
offense against a victim who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense, the court shall (1) 
inform the person that the entry of a finding of guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject 
the person to the registration requirements of this section, and (2) determine that the person 
fully understands the consequences of the plea. If such person changes such person's address 
such person shall, within five days, register the new address in writing with the 
Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the new address is in another state, such person shall 
also register with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that state has a registration 
requirement for such offenders. If any person who is subject to registration under this section 
regularly travels into or within another state or temporarily resides in another state for 
purposes including, but not limited to employment or schooling, such person shall notify the 
Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state 
provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. During such period of 
registration, each registrant shall complete and return forms mailed to such registrant to 
verify such registrant's residence address and shall submit to the retaking of a photographic 
image upon request of the Commissioner of Public Safety
* * *
(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-252 (West 2002)
TITLE 54. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 969 REGISTRATION OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
§ 54-252. Registration of person who has committed a sexually violent offense.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
of a sexually violent offense, and (1) is released into the community on or after October 1, 
1988, and prior to October 1, 1998, and resides in this state, shall, on October 1, 1998, or 
within three days of residing in this state, whichever is later, or (2) is released into the 
community on or after October 1, 1998, shall, within three days following such release, 
register such person’s name, identifying factors, criminal history record, documentation of 
any treatment received for mental abnormality or personality disorder, and residence address 
with the Commissioner of Public Safety on such forms and in such locations as said 
commissioner shall direct, and shall maintain such registration for life. Prior to accepting a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a person with respect to a sexually violent offense, the 
court shall (A) inform the person that the entry of a finding of guilty after acceptance of the 
plea will subject the person to the registration requirements of this section, and (B) determine 
that the person fiilly understands the consequences of the plea. If such person changes such 
person's address such person shall, within five days, register the new address in writing with 
the Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the new address is in another state, such person 
shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that state has a 
registration requirement for such offenders. If any person who is subject to registration under 
this section regularly travels into or within another state or temporarily resides in another 
state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or schooling, such person shall 
notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register with an appropriate agency 
in that slate, provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. During 
such period of registration, each registrant shall complete and return forms mailed to such 
registrant to verify such registrant's residence address and shall submit to the retaking of a 
photographic image upon request of the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(b) Any person who has been subject to the registration requirements of section 54-102r of the 
general statutes, revised to January I, 1997, as amended by section 1 of public act 97-183, 
shall, not later than three working days after October 1, 1998, register under this section and 
thereafter comply with the provisions of sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, during the initial 
registration period following October 1, 1998, the Commissioner of Public Safety may phase 
in completion of the registration procedure for persons released into the community prior to 
said date over the first three months following said date, and no such person shall be 
prosecuted for failure to register under this section during those three months provided such 
person complies with the directives of said commissioner regarding registration procedures.
(d) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
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Conn. Gen. Stat § 54-253 (West 2002)
TITLE 54. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 969 REGISTRATION OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
§ 54-253. Registration of person who has committed a sexual offense in another jurisdiction.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
in any other state, in a federal or military court or in any foreign jurisdiction of any crime, the 
essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes specified in 
subdivisions (2), (5) and (11) of section 54-250 and who resides in this state on and after 
October 1, 1998, shall, within ten days of residing in this state, register with the 
Commissioner of Public Safety in the same manner as if such person had been convicted or 
found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of such crime in this state, except that 
for purposes of determining the ten-year period of registration under section 54-251 such 
person shall be deemed to have initially registered on the date of such person's release into 
the community in such other state, federal or military system or foreign jurisdiction.
(b) Any person not a resident of this state who is registered as a sexual offender under the laws 
of any other state and who regularly travels into or within this state or temporarily resides in 
this state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or schooling shall, within 
three days after the commencement of such travel or residence in this state, register such 
person's name, identifying factors, criminal history record, locations visited on a recurring 
basis or residence address, if any, in this state, and residence address in such person's home 
state with the Commissioner of Public Safety on such forms and in such locations as said 
commissioner shall direct and shall maintain such registration until such travel or residence 
terminates or until such person is released from registration as a sexual offender in such other 
state. If such person terminates such person's travel or residence in this state or changes such 
person's address in this state such person shall, within five days, provide notice in writing to 
the Commissioner of Public Safety.
(c) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-254 (West 2002)
TITLE 54. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 969 REGISTRATION OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
§ 54-254. Registration of person who has committed a felony for a sexual purpose.
(a) Any person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
in this state on or after October 1, 1998, of any felony that the court finds was committed for 
a sexual purpose, may be required by the court upon release into the community to register 
such person's name, identifying factors, criminal history record and residence address with 
the Commissioner of Public Safety, on such forms and in such locations as the commissioner 
shall direct, and to maintain such registration for ten years. If the court finds that a person has 
committed a felony for a sexual purpose and intends to require such person to register under 
this section, prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from such person with 
respect to such felony, the court shall (1) inform the person that the entry of a finding of 
guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration requirements of 
this section, and (2) determine that the person fully understands the consequences of the plea. 
If such person changes such person's address such person shall, within five days, register the 
new address in writing with the Commissioner of Public Safety, and, if the new address is in 
another state, such person shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state, 
provided that state has a registration requirement for such offenders. If any person who is 
subject to registration under this section regularly travels into or within another state or 
temporarily resides in another state for purposes including, but not limited to employment or 
schooling, such person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register 
with an appropriate agency in that state, provided that state has a registration requirement for 
such offenders. During such period of registration, each registrant shall complete arid return 
forms mailed to such registrant to verify such registrant's residence address and shall submit 
to the retaking of a photographic image upon request of the Commissioner of Public Safety
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257 (West 2002)
TITLE 54. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 969 REGISTRATION OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
§ 54-257. Registry. Suspension of registration. Verification of address.
(a) The Department of Public Safety shall, not later than January I, 1999, establish and maintain 
a registry of all persons required to register under sections 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 and 54- 
254. The department shall, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, 
the Department of Correction and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, develop 
appropriate forms for use by agencies and individuals to report registration information, 
including changes of address. Upon receipt of registration information, the department shall 
enter the information into the registry and notify the local police department or state police 
troop having jurisdiction where the registrant resides or plans to reside. If a registrant reports 
a residence in another state, the department shall notify the state police agency of that state or 
such other agency in that state that maintains registry information, if known. The department 
shall also transmit all registration information, conviction data, photographic images and 
fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in such form as said bureau shall require 
for inclusion in a national registry.
(b) The Department of Public Safety may suspend the registration of any person registered under 
section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254 while such person is incarcerated, under civil 
commitment or residing outside this state. During the period that such registration is under 
suspension, the department is not required to verify the address of the registrant pursuant to 
subsection (c) of this section and may withdraw the registration information from public 
access. Upon the release of the registrant from incarceration or civil commitment or 
resumption of residency in this state by the registrant, the department shall reinstate the 
registration, redistribute the registration information in accordance with subsection (a) of this 
section and resume verifying the address of the registrant in accordance with subsection (c) 
of this section. Suspension of registration shall not affect the date of expiration of the 
registration obligation of the registrant under section 54-251, 54-252 or 54-253.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Department of Public Safety shall 
verify the address of each registrant by mailing a nonforwardable verification form to the 
registrant at the registrant's last reported address. Such form shall require the registrant to 
sign a statement that the registrant continues to reside at the registrant's last reported address 
and return the form by mail by a date which is ten days after the date such form was mailed 
to the registrant. The form shall contain a statement that failure to return the form or 
providing false information is a violation of section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254, as the 
case may be. Each person required to register under section 54-251 or 54-254 shall have such 
person's address verified in such manner annually on the anniversary of such person's initial 
registration date Each person required to register under section 54-252 shall have such 
person's address verified in such manner every ninety days after such person's initial 
registration date. Each person required to register under section 54-253 shall have such 
person's address verified in such manner either annually on the anniversary of such person's
initial registration date or every ninety days after such person's initial registration date 
depending upon whether, after such initial registration, such person is subject to the 
requirements of section 54-251 or section 54-252, respectively. In the event that a registrant 
fails to return the address verification form, the Department of Public Safety shall notify the 
local police department or the state police troop having jurisdiction over the registrant's last 
reported address, and that agency shall apply for a warrant to be issued for the registrant's 
arrest under section 54-251, 54-252, 54-253 or 54-254, as the case may be. The Department 
of Public Safety shall not verily the address of registrants whose last reported address was 
outside this state,
(d) The Department of Public Safety shall retake the photographic image of each registrant at 
least once every five years.
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APPENDIX C
Alaska Stat. § 12.55.148 (LEXIS L. Publg 2002)
TITLE 12 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 55. SENTENCING AND PROBATION
Sec. 12.55.148. Judgment for sex offenses or child kidnappings
(a) When a defendant is convicted of a sex offense or child kidnapping by a court of this state, 
the written judgment must set out the requirements of AS 12.63.010 and, if it can be 
determined by the court, whether that conviction will require the offender or kidnapper to 
register for life or a lesser period under AS 12 63.
(b) In this section, “sex offense” and “child kidnapping” have the meanings given in AS
12.63.100.
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Alaska Stat. § 12.63 010 (LEXIS L Publg. 2(m)
TITLE 12 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 63. REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS
Sec. 12.63.010. Registration of sex offenders and related requirements
(a) A sex offender or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state shall register as 
provided in this section. The sex offender or child kidnapper shall register
(1) within the 30-day period before release from an in-state correctional facility;
(2) by the next working day following conviction for a sex offense or child kidnapping if the 
sex offender is not incarcerated at the time of conviction, or
(3) by the next working day of becoming physically present in the state
(b) A sex offender or child kidnapper required to register under (a) of this section shall register 
with the Department of Corrections if the sex offender or child kidnapper is incarcerated or 
in person at the Alaska state trooper post or municipal police department located nearest to 
where the sex offender or child kidnapper resides at the time of registration. To fulfill the 
registration requirement, the sex offender or child kidnapper shall
(1) complete a registration form that includes, at a minimum,
(A) the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s name, address, place of employment, date of 
birth;
(B) each conviction for a sex offense or child kidnapping for which the duty to register 
has not terminated under AS 12 63.020, date of sex offense or child kidnapping 
convictions, place and court of sex offense or child kidnapping convictions, whether the 
sex offender or child kidnapper has been unconditionally discharged from the conviction 
for a sex offense or child kidnapping and the date of the unconditional discharge; if the 
sex offender or child kidnapper asserts that the offender or kidnapper has been 
unconditionally discharged, the offender or kidnapper shall supply proof of that discharge 
acceptable to the department,
(C) all aliases used;
(D) driver’s license number;
(E) description, license numbers, and vehicle identification numbers of motor vehicles 
the sex offender or child kidnapper has access to regardless of whether that access is 
regular or not,
(F) any identifying features of the sex offender or child kidnapper;
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(G) anticipated changes of address; and
(H) a statement concerning whether the offender or kidnapper has had treatment for a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder since the date of conviction for an offense 
requiring registration under this chapter;
(2) allow the Alaska state troopers, Department of Corrections, or municipal police to take a 
complete set of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s fingerprints and to take the sex 
offender’s or child kidnapper’s photograph.
(c) If a sex offender or child kidnapper changes residence after having registered under (a) of 
this section, the sex offender or child kidnapper shall provide written notice of the change by 
the next working day following the change to the Alaska state trooper post or municipal 
police department located nearest to the new residence or, if the residence change is out of 
state, to the central registry.
(d) A sex offender or child kidnapper required to register
(1) for 15 years under (a) of this section and AS 12.63.020(a)(2) shall, annually, during the 
term of a duty to register under AS 12.63,020, on a date set by the department at the time 
of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s initial registration, provide written verification 
to the department, in the manner required by the department, of the sex offender s or 
child kidnapper’s address and notice of any changes to the information previously 
provided under (b)(1) of this section;
(2) for life under (a) of this section and AS 12.63.020(a)(1) shall, not less than quarterly, on a 
date set by the department, provide written verification to the department, in the manner 
required by the department, of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper s address and any 
changes to the information previously provided under (b)(1) of this section.
(e) The registration form required to be submitted under (b) of this section and the annual or 
quarterly verifications must be sworn to by the offender or kidnapper and contain an 
admonition that a false statement shall subject the offender or kidnapper to prosecution for 
perjury.
(f) In this section, “correctional facility” has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901.
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In this chapter, 
♦ ♦ ♦
(3) “conviction” means that an adult, or a juvenile charged as an adult under AS 47.12 or a 
similar procedure in another jurisdiction, has entered a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, 
or nolo contendere, or has been found guilty or guilty but mentally ill by a court or jury, of a 
sex offense or child kidnapping regardless of whether the judgment was set aside under AS 
12.55 085 or a similar procedure in another jurisdiction or was the subject of a pardon or 
other executive clemency; “conviction” does not include a judgment that has been reversed 
or vacated by a court,
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
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